Sounds like the title of a children's book.
Friday, November 26, 2010
Jody in Garmsir
On a walk through the bazaar in Garmsir district, in Helmand province, during her latest congressional delegation visit. I will let her write more details about it and the boy she gave a dollar to.
Sunday, November 21, 2010
Stuff I Didn't Take Photos Of
I stayed the night at the Kandahar city PRT. It's a fairly large base, though nowhere near as big as Helmand, and of course much smaller than the regional platforms. It's mixed Canadian-American. Since it's right in the city, they don't light it up at night, since that would just make it easier for the mortars. So I course I wandered around after sunset trying to figure out where the hell I was, where I was supposed to be, and where the bathroom had wandered off to. Surprisingly, the night sky was very clear; there was none of the suspended dust that's typical of Kandahar during the day. I stayed in a hooch left empty by someone on vacation. Hooches, or containerized housing units, are literally the types of containers you would see on a cargo ship or a train, though a bit smaller. They tend to be about 8 feet wide, maybe 20 feet deep. In this space there were two bunk beds, so space for four people. There was a mini-closet and one shelf for books and toiletries. These are "dry" hooches, meaning they have no running water, and thus the toilets and showers are located some distance away - maybe 60 yards away in Kandahar, much farther (200+ yards) in other places I've seen. And it gets very cold in Kandahar at night. The hooches are also unheated (and uncooled, which matters in the summer), so I brought a thermal sleeping bag. The next morning, there was a cat hanging around outside my door. I sat down to pet him, and he immediately climbed into my lap, then tried to climb up onto my shoulder. When I got up, the cat went over to my hooch door, waiting for me to let him in.
While we were flying back from the PRT to the airbase, we flew VERY low - maybe a few hundred feet, certainly lower than 400 feet. We flew over a nomad encampment with several camels tethered near the tents. The helicopters shot off flares as a safety precaution during the flight. As we were coming in to land at KAF, we saw many, many Predator drones near their sheds, either for maintenance or because they were getting ready to take off. We also passed Prowlers, a Navy plane, and the A-10 warthogs, the gunships.
The most interesting conversation was the previous evening. One of the running disputes between some on the military side and some on the civilian side is why is it taking so long to establish some semblance of effective Afghan governance in regions "cleared" (theoretically) of insurgents. The civilians maintain the continuing security problems are a big deterrent to potential Afghan civil servants unwilling to go to some places for a mere $4 monthly supplement. The military insists security is perfectly acceptable. So we asked, How many government officials, or people (like teachers) who could reasonably be seen as government-affiliated, have been killed over the past couple of months for what seem to be political reasons, for reasons of intimidation, as opposed to regular crime? The answer: a lot. I can't say the exact number, but it was a lot. We're not talking two or three here, but dozens. And one man admitted, in a bit of an understatement, "In Kandahar, we have something of an assassination problem."
And completely unrelated is this: just because someone with a college education who is writing something on behalf of the US government doesn't mean the resulting document isn't filled with hilarious errors. Upon my return I saw one that described efforts to work with Americans living and working in Afghanistan. And what do you call such Americans living overseas? According to the document: "ex-patriots."
Traitors.
While we were flying back from the PRT to the airbase, we flew VERY low - maybe a few hundred feet, certainly lower than 400 feet. We flew over a nomad encampment with several camels tethered near the tents. The helicopters shot off flares as a safety precaution during the flight. As we were coming in to land at KAF, we saw many, many Predator drones near their sheds, either for maintenance or because they were getting ready to take off. We also passed Prowlers, a Navy plane, and the A-10 warthogs, the gunships.
The most interesting conversation was the previous evening. One of the running disputes between some on the military side and some on the civilian side is why is it taking so long to establish some semblance of effective Afghan governance in regions "cleared" (theoretically) of insurgents. The civilians maintain the continuing security problems are a big deterrent to potential Afghan civil servants unwilling to go to some places for a mere $4 monthly supplement. The military insists security is perfectly acceptable. So we asked, How many government officials, or people (like teachers) who could reasonably be seen as government-affiliated, have been killed over the past couple of months for what seem to be political reasons, for reasons of intimidation, as opposed to regular crime? The answer: a lot. I can't say the exact number, but it was a lot. We're not talking two or three here, but dozens. And one man admitted, in a bit of an understatement, "In Kandahar, we have something of an assassination problem."
And completely unrelated is this: just because someone with a college education who is writing something on behalf of the US government doesn't mean the resulting document isn't filled with hilarious errors. Upon my return I saw one that described efforts to work with Americans living and working in Afghanistan. And what do you call such Americans living overseas? According to the document: "ex-patriots."
Traitors.
Friday, November 19, 2010
To and From the Airport
This time when we drove out to the airport, it took no time at all, maybe 6 or 7 minutes. There was no traffic at all because it's Eid, a big feast holiday. Interestingly, on the way to the Kabul airport in the early morning, there were hundreds of goats and sheep and even a few oxen and cows being driven along Airport Road. On the way back, there was still no traffic to speak of, but there were substantially fewer animals. Coincidentally, Afghans eat a lot of lamb and goat and the occasional beef when they can get it during Eid. So yeah, nearly every animal we saw on Tuesday morning had been slaughtered by Wednesday evening.
Usually it's dark when I come back from the airport on trips outside Kabul. What's freaky is that if you're driving back right around sunset, it coincides with the call to prayer. The streets in Kabul are totally unlit. Unless there's a shop, a bonfire, or headlights of an oncoming vehicle, it is pitch black. And at sunset, frequently, our car will swerve violently or slam on the brakes to avoid hitting men - it's always and only men - literally in the middle of the street who have gotten out of their cars, carts, taxis or buses, put their prayer rugs down in the street, and are doing their prayers.
Usually it's dark when I come back from the airport on trips outside Kabul. What's freaky is that if you're driving back right around sunset, it coincides with the call to prayer. The streets in Kabul are totally unlit. Unless there's a shop, a bonfire, or headlights of an oncoming vehicle, it is pitch black. And at sunset, frequently, our car will swerve violently or slam on the brakes to avoid hitting men - it's always and only men - literally in the middle of the street who have gotten out of their cars, carts, taxis or buses, put their prayer rugs down in the street, and are doing their prayers.
And Yet More Mountain Views
I take a lot of pictures from the window of the airplane. There isn't much else to do, and even though the terrain is similar, I guess, I still find it fascinating. These pictures are in sequence from about 45 minutes NE of Kandahar to closer to Kabul, though still 15 minutes or so west of the city. The flight from Kabul to Kandahar takes just over an hour, but the return flight takes well more than 90 minutes, closer to two hours. I have no idea why this is. All I know is, for the first time since I have been in Afghanistan, I traveled somewhere and wasn't delayed hours and/or days by dust storms or dark or something else. Also, a traveling companion, who up to now had been mortared on every single trip, and thus who is clearly bad luck (I have been shelled outside Kabul only three times), also broke his streak, as no incoming at all occurred. This probably means that when I go back to Helmand, as I must next week, I'm due for a double whammy.
Arghandab River
Here you can see the stretch of vegetation, in this case irrigated orchards, along the river - the Arghandab, near Kandahar city, an area hotly contested over the past few months between US Marines and the insurgency. As mentioned previously, it's just past harvest season, so the leaves have turned and many of the fields are already denuded, but you can see the grids of each farming plot. This is a fairly populated and prosperous part of Afghanistan.
Rocks
Before we came here, we were told that Afghanistan would be phenomenally wealthy if rocks were riches. It's hard to sufficiently stress just how mountainous, and barren, and rocky and dusty the land is. These are comparatively small rocky upcroppings near Kandahar city. They are typical of what you see in much of Afghanistan, at least south of the Hindu Kush. Suddenly rocky narrow ridges will rise up like the spine on a prickly-backed fish, like in the last photo.
Dry Mud and Dirt
The first is a typical view from the air. Most villages are composed of low mud walls forming more or less rectangular shapes, within which is the family farming plot and the one-story mud house. The only green comes near the river or near the irrigation canals. Outside the villages - sometimes not very far outside - often the earth is so parched that it is scarred with long cracks. The last three photos show a pattern I hadn't seen before. I don't know what caused this. The river isn't very close; it's clearly not caused by water erosion. But maybe this has something to do with groundwater being removed, and then the earth collapsing. I don't know. Whatever the cause, I thought it was worth posting the photos.
Flowers at the Shrine
Ok, so they're just flowers. What you have to keep in mind is that this is a very arid and poor place, so it takes quite a bit of upkeep to keep these flowers watered and in bloom. Nevertheless, the locals do it, because they want to keep the shrine area beautiful,
Goats in Khakrez
This man lives in a mud house very near the shrine, and he keeps goats. And they were very shaggy. They kept in the shade as much as possible.
More from the Shrine
From closer up. We went walking "outside the wire," as they call it. So we landed in the "strong point," a mini-base, about 150 yards or so from the shrine. Then we walk to the gate, which is open, and one of the soldiers drags the barbed wire that is blocking the road off to one side, we walk past it and off we go up the hill toward the shrine. That's outside the wire. We spent about an hour walking around in the little town, and then walked back to the mini-base, the soldier dragged the barbed wire back into place, and we were back "inside the wire." Unfortunately, I hadn't had coffee that morning, so I was not wired myself.
Khakrez Shrine
It's called the Ziarat-e Shah mosque, though what you see here isn't really the mosque but rather the shrine, the burial place, itself. It's pretty sparse. We went there during the second day of Eid and there was practically no one else. Believe it or not, this is a place for tourism within Afghanistan. But nearly all the shops were closed because of the holiday, except for a handful selling nuts and candy and cheap plastic prayer beads.
Orchards
Southwestern Afghanistan is extremely dry. It's basically a desert, though it does have a thin river or two winding through it. But the Afghans are exceptional at making the most of the scant water resources there, and nearly every time you see a patch of vegetation, you can bet that the green part is irrigated. Here are orchards from a bit to the north of Kandahar city. I couldn't have recognized the tree even at ground level, unless maybe it had fruit on it, so I sure couldn't tell from the air what they were. This was maybe a couple of weeks after pomegranate harvest, though, so maybe many of these are pomegranate orchards. There are probably some apple trees mixed in there as well. At any rate, you can see the leaves have turned color, and the ruts and rows for regular vegetables and grains have long since been harvested. It still is very hot in the daytime, in the 80s or so with a bright burning sun, but at night it dips into the low 40s, maybe even 30s F.
Hueys
Here are photos from the helicopter as we flew to Khakrez from Kandahar. The mountains weren't very high and most of the time we were flying over fairly barren terrain. It was about a 20-25 minute flight from the air field, once the mechanical difficulties were overcome. We flew much, much lower on the way back; I assume there were safety reasons for the different tactics. A bit before we landed in Khakrez the helicopters shot off flares to distract any possible incoming rockets. When we flew from Khakrez into Kandahar city itself, we were skimming so low over the ground, maybe 400 feet, that you could see people's faces quite distinctly, and wave back to the kids who waved up to us.
Wednesday, November 17, 2010
From the Helicopter Pad
We flew to Kandahar and then were supposed to take helicopters, tiny Hueys barely bigger than traffic helicopters, to Khakrez. The three helicopters were lined up along the pad; we boarded, and we all took off, flying very low along the airport side runway, since it's important to avoid rising abruptly into the path of an F-16, a Blackhawk or a Warthog, all of which are significantly bigger than the Huey, as it lands or takes off. Well, we had been skimming along the runway for about 45 seconds when we turned around, went back to the landing pad and disembarked. Turns out the third helicopter had "a mechanical issue" that had made it rise about 20 feet off the ground and then come clunking down on the runway. And Hueys don't have wheels; they have skids. So it didn't land gently. So they had to send a fourth helicopter to pick up the people from the third helo and then we did it all over again. While we were waiting for them to take care of the third helicopter, we saw this bomb casing and cover to an outdoor grill, so I took a picture. I don't like it when my flight is delayed because some jerk shows up at the last minute at the check-in gate. I am miffed when the flight is delayed for weather in a distant city. But I am always happy to wait out a flight if the aircraft in question has "a mechanical issue," because when I asked the pilot what, specifically, that issue might be, he replied, "It's fucked up and will crash if we try to fly it."
Outpost
This is in the province of Khakrez, a 20-minute or so helicopter ride from Kandahar. It's near a village with maybe 250 families or so, probably 1500 people. We heard about efforts to establish a women's health clinic. Male doctors aren't allowed to examine female patients, so unless you can get female health professionals trained, things are likely to remain bleak. Bleak means this: 1 in 5 babies born in this village die; nearly 1 in 5 mothers die during childbirth. The day before we visited, a 16-year old girl visited - she was on her fourth pregnancy. Soon after came a 14-year old; she was on her second. There is no school. There is not much agriculture in the area; it's mostly goats and what passes for tourism, since Khakrez is the site of Afghanistan's third most important shrine. It's the burial place of the man who brought Islam to Afghanistan. Seems he was murdered by the locals., Long afterwards, when people realized the historical importance of the martyr, the shrine was built to honor him and his reputed grave.
Golf is a Rough Game
This is a golf cart in a little village northwest of Kandahar city. Golf is different in Afghanistan, at least in this part of Afghanistan. There are no "greens," since there is no grass. The whole course is basically a sand trap - at least those parts of the course that aren't mined. On the other hand, the holes are larger, since they've probably suffered the occasional incoming mortar. When we visited what's called a "strong point" in this isolated rural area, we came across a bag with 8 or 10 golf clubs on the lookout deck, perhaps to while away the time on watch. But we also came across this little golf cart, which, as you can see, is somewhat more heavily armed that your usual golf cart. Word of advice: when you're playing with this guy, and he says he thinks he should be able to take a mulligan, it's probably wise not to argue.
Monday, November 15, 2010
Tall Tales
In the orientation classes before coming here, we were told that often Afghans will relay an important lesson by telling a story or anecdote, rather than coming out openly and making an assertion. But it wasn't until recently that I actually witnessed this happening. I was at a meeting at a certain government ministry with the minister, and the topic was whether the US, and the international community in general, was getting much impact from the vast resources they were putting into Afghanistan, and if not, where the fault was for that. There is much talk that the root problem is corruption among Afghan officials, or ambivalence or reluctance among the Afghan population. But of course from the Afghan perspective, the problem might be with the approach of the foreigners - say, an inattention to facets like coordination, or doing things like building a school without checking to see if there were any available teachers to staff it. But the minister didn't openly say that. Instead, he told a story - who knows if it's true - about a well-meaning effort by the foreigners in an unnamed district.
There was a district, he said, where the US had decided it was necessary to build a water pipeline. No doubt that was a worthy project, though the US had not consulted with the village elders to see if the water pipeline was the most important need, or if the planned place for it was the best site or, on the contrary, might exacerbate any existing conflict over land or water. The US officials had simply made a decision; no doubt they had a map that showed where pipes were and weren't, and this was one of the places where the map would look better if a line could be drawn showing another pipe. In planning the work, the US had divided the project into three distinct parts, the minister said, and decided to hire three different groups of people to perform the work. In this way, he said, perhaps the US thought it was doing well by spreading the benefits of the work, or reducing the opportunity for a single individual to skim off money; certainly there must have been good reasons. The US officials hired one group of men to dig the ditch. They hired another group of men to bring the pipe and place it. And they hired a third group of men to fill in the ditch. This was a very good effort, the minister said. The only thing forgotten was to coordinate the work of the three groups, or tell the men how their part of the project fit into the overall project, or direct the timing of the individual projects.
And so the first group of men went one day and dug their ditch. Some time later, the third group of men went and filled in the hole. And some time after that, the second group of men took the pipe to the place, laid it on the ground on top of the freshly filled-in ditch, and considered their work done. And all three groups had done exactly as they were asked and paid to do, the minister said. And yet there is still a problem with water in the village.
He didn't say any more; he didn't need to. We were drinking tea while he told this story (in English - he spoke pretty good English, though the interpreter had to re-tell the story in Dari for his staff to understand, after which they just smiled softly).
There was a district, he said, where the US had decided it was necessary to build a water pipeline. No doubt that was a worthy project, though the US had not consulted with the village elders to see if the water pipeline was the most important need, or if the planned place for it was the best site or, on the contrary, might exacerbate any existing conflict over land or water. The US officials had simply made a decision; no doubt they had a map that showed where pipes were and weren't, and this was one of the places where the map would look better if a line could be drawn showing another pipe. In planning the work, the US had divided the project into three distinct parts, the minister said, and decided to hire three different groups of people to perform the work. In this way, he said, perhaps the US thought it was doing well by spreading the benefits of the work, or reducing the opportunity for a single individual to skim off money; certainly there must have been good reasons. The US officials hired one group of men to dig the ditch. They hired another group of men to bring the pipe and place it. And they hired a third group of men to fill in the ditch. This was a very good effort, the minister said. The only thing forgotten was to coordinate the work of the three groups, or tell the men how their part of the project fit into the overall project, or direct the timing of the individual projects.
And so the first group of men went one day and dug their ditch. Some time later, the third group of men went and filled in the hole. And some time after that, the second group of men took the pipe to the place, laid it on the ground on top of the freshly filled-in ditch, and considered their work done. And all three groups had done exactly as they were asked and paid to do, the minister said. And yet there is still a problem with water in the village.
He didn't say any more; he didn't need to. We were drinking tea while he told this story (in English - he spoke pretty good English, though the interpreter had to re-tell the story in Dari for his staff to understand, after which they just smiled softly).
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
The Occasional Buzzword
Every workplace has its own jargon. Here there is a lot of empty phraseology and use of the passive voice, much of it imported from the military, that some people have incorporated into their routine style of speaking in an effort to sound informed and keyed in. And yes, it makes them sound like blustering know-nothings at times. Luckily, there are some people who have kept their sense of humor and sense of perspective. So there is a now famous draft cable that has been furtively shared but never sent out, not that it would ever get clearance. It's too long to re-print here. But here are excerpts:
"Subject: A Key Strategic Tipping-Point Game-Changer
In Afghanistan, the next step could be a key strategic tipping-point game-changer. By leaning forward in the foxhole and checking the headspace and timing of the program, we could grab the low-hanging fruit while staying at the 30,000 foot level... The remaining challenge is to socialize the stakeholders and operationalize the cultural coordination across the interagency.... Once the concept has been solidified, we will need to nest it... The primary challenge has become the ability to get fidelity on the problem set. Secondarily we need to shape the battlefield and dial it in. After getting smart so that we do not lose the bubble, the long pole in the tent needs to be identified. Once we have pinned the rose on someone, then we must send them downrange. Then we must define the delta so that it can be lashed up.... We must also ensure that the time from flash to bang is short. Fundamental is the requirement that the key strategic tipping-point game-changer be made to pop. If it does not pop, it should be devolved and then taken offline. After adjusting, it is important to brief, so that we can tee off and drill down on it. It is a go if it is calibrated to the topic. If not, fears about a resurgent corruption capacity nexus could be realized.... Unity of effort is a big problem especially the first and second orders of effect. If there is a failure to birddog it, more crosstalk and crosspollination will be required. Situational awareness is key but it is also important to operationalize the laydown. Once there has been an operationalization of the concept of incentivization, then it can be distilled and put on a map. That, of course, does not define the end state or address structural laydowns or possible electronic graveyard issues. Those issues need to be racked and stacked before going in front of what will become the touchstone entity. Concomitant risks include becoming a traffic accident in search of an intersection and failure to check the azimuth or define the left and right. Probably nothing in Afghanistan is as important as the deep dive. Once the deep dive has been scrubbed, a hot wash can be done. After that, a cold wash can be dialed in. The delta can be large, making a drill down difficult, if the product is not properly engaged. We need to stay focused on first downs. In sum, a FRAGO is needed."
The sad thing is, there are people here who actually talk like this.
"Subject: A Key Strategic Tipping-Point Game-Changer
In Afghanistan, the next step could be a key strategic tipping-point game-changer. By leaning forward in the foxhole and checking the headspace and timing of the program, we could grab the low-hanging fruit while staying at the 30,000 foot level... The remaining challenge is to socialize the stakeholders and operationalize the cultural coordination across the interagency.... Once the concept has been solidified, we will need to nest it... The primary challenge has become the ability to get fidelity on the problem set. Secondarily we need to shape the battlefield and dial it in. After getting smart so that we do not lose the bubble, the long pole in the tent needs to be identified. Once we have pinned the rose on someone, then we must send them downrange. Then we must define the delta so that it can be lashed up.... We must also ensure that the time from flash to bang is short. Fundamental is the requirement that the key strategic tipping-point game-changer be made to pop. If it does not pop, it should be devolved and then taken offline. After adjusting, it is important to brief, so that we can tee off and drill down on it. It is a go if it is calibrated to the topic. If not, fears about a resurgent corruption capacity nexus could be realized.... Unity of effort is a big problem especially the first and second orders of effect. If there is a failure to birddog it, more crosstalk and crosspollination will be required. Situational awareness is key but it is also important to operationalize the laydown. Once there has been an operationalization of the concept of incentivization, then it can be distilled and put on a map. That, of course, does not define the end state or address structural laydowns or possible electronic graveyard issues. Those issues need to be racked and stacked before going in front of what will become the touchstone entity. Concomitant risks include becoming a traffic accident in search of an intersection and failure to check the azimuth or define the left and right. Probably nothing in Afghanistan is as important as the deep dive. Once the deep dive has been scrubbed, a hot wash can be done. After that, a cold wash can be dialed in. The delta can be large, making a drill down difficult, if the product is not properly engaged. We need to stay focused on first downs. In sum, a FRAGO is needed."
The sad thing is, there are people here who actually talk like this.
Tuesday, November 9, 2010
Marine Ball
This was a Marine Ball different from others we've attended. For starters, it wasn't in any fancy five-star hotel, though it was catered by the Serena, Kabul's leading hotel. It was on the Embassy lawn, with (Afghan) carpets strewn everywhere and a big tent to accommodate the hundreds of guests. The tent was fortunate, since there was a thunderstorm with a rain that was reasonably heavy by Kabul standards. For another thing, while there are always military personnel present at a Marine Ball, there was a much higher percentage this time. And finally, the ceremony tends to be the same: video showing significant historical moments of the Marines, message from the Commandant, Ambassador gives a speech, cake cut, oldest Marine and youngest Marine present get the first slices of the cake - but as the last two photos show, there was something else - an empty table setting in honor of and to remember the Marines who cannot attend. The salt represents the tears shed for their loss; the lemon, the bitterness of their passing; the table setting upside down to signify that he cannot partake of the feast.
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