Hueys

 Here are photos from the helicopter as we flew to Khakrez from Kandahar.  The mountains weren't very high and most of the time we were flying over fairly barren terrain.  It was about a 20-25 minute flight from the air field, once the mechanical difficulties were overcome.  We flew much, much lower on the way back; I assume there were safety reasons for the different tactics.  A bit before we landed in Khakrez the helicopters shot off flares to distract any possible incoming rockets.  When we flew from Khakrez into Kandahar city itself, we were skimming so low over the ground, maybe 400 feet, that you could see people's faces quite distinctly, and wave back to the kids who waved up to us.

From the Helicopter Pad

 We flew to Kandahar and then were supposed to take helicopters, tiny Hueys barely bigger than traffic helicopters, to Khakrez.  The three helicopters were lined up along the pad; we boarded, and we all took off, flying very low along the airport side runway, since it's important to avoid rising abruptly into the path of an F-16, a Blackhawk or a Warthog, all of which are significantly bigger than the Huey, as it lands or takes off.  Well, we had been skimming along the runway for about 45 seconds when we turned around, went back to the landing pad and disembarked.  Turns out the third helicopter had "a mechanical issue" that had made it rise about 20 feet off the ground and then come clunking down on the runway.  And Hueys don't have wheels; they have skids.  So it didn't land gently.  So they had to send a fourth helicopter to pick up the people from the third helo and then we did it all over again.  While we were waiting for them to take care of the third helicopter, we saw this bomb casing and cover to an outdoor grill, so I took a picture.  I don't like it when my flight is delayed because some jerk shows up at the last minute at the check-in gate.  I am miffed when the flight is delayed for weather in a distant city.  But I am always happy to wait out a flight if the aircraft in question has "a mechanical issue," because when I asked the pilot what, specifically, that issue might be, he replied, "It's fucked up and will crash if we try to fly it."

Outpost

 This is in the province of Khakrez, a 20-minute or so helicopter ride from Kandahar.  It's near a village with maybe 250 families or so, probably 1500 people.  We heard about efforts to establish a women's health clinic.  Male doctors aren't allowed to examine female patients, so unless you can get female health professionals trained, things are likely to remain bleak.  Bleak means this:  1 in 5 babies born in this village die; nearly 1 in 5 mothers die during childbirth.  The day before we visited, a 16-year old girl visited - she was on her fourth pregnancy.  Soon after came a 14-year old; she was on her second.  There is no school.  There is not much agriculture in the area; it's mostly goats and what passes for tourism, since Khakrez is the site of Afghanistan's third most important shrine.  It's the burial place of the man who brought Islam to Afghanistan.  Seems he was murdered by the locals.,  Long afterwards, when people realized the historical importance of the martyr, the shrine was built to honor him and his reputed grave.

Golf is a Rough Game

This is a golf cart in a little village northwest of Kandahar city.  Golf is different in Afghanistan, at least in this part of Afghanistan.  There are no "greens," since there is no grass.  The whole course is basically a sand trap - at least those parts of the course that aren't mined.  On the other hand, the holes are larger, since they've probably suffered the occasional incoming mortar.  When we visited what's called a "strong point" in this isolated rural area, we came across a bag with 8 or 10 golf clubs on the lookout deck, perhaps to while away the time on watch.  But we also came across this little golf cart, which, as you can see, is somewhat more heavily armed that your usual golf cart.  Word of advice: when you're playing with this guy, and he says he thinks he should be able to take a mulligan, it's probably wise not to argue.

Tall Tales

In the orientation classes before coming here, we were told that often Afghans will relay an important lesson by telling a story or anecdote, rather than coming out openly and making an assertion.  But it wasn't until recently that I actually witnessed this happening.  I was at a meeting at a certain government ministry with the minister, and the topic was whether the US, and the international community in general, was getting much impact from the vast resources they were putting into Afghanistan, and if not, where the fault was for that.  There is much talk that the root problem is corruption among Afghan officials, or ambivalence or reluctance among the Afghan population.  But of course from the Afghan perspective, the problem might be with the approach of the foreigners - say, an inattention to facets like coordination, or doing things like building a school without checking to see if there were any available teachers to staff it.  But the minister didn't openly say that.  Instead, he told a story - who knows if it's true - about a well-meaning effort by the foreigners in an unnamed district. 

There was a district, he said, where the US had decided it was necessary to build a water pipeline.  No doubt that was a worthy project, though the US had not consulted with the village elders to see if the water pipeline was the most important need, or if the planned place for it was the best site or, on the contrary, might exacerbate any existing conflict over land or water.  The US officials had simply made a decision; no doubt they had a map that showed where pipes were and weren't, and this was one of the places where the map would look better if a line could be drawn showing another pipe.  In planning the work, the US had divided the project into three distinct parts, the minister said, and decided to hire three different groups of people to perform the work.  In this way, he said, perhaps the US thought it was doing well by spreading the benefits of the work, or reducing the opportunity for a single individual to skim off money; certainly there must have been good reasons.  The US officials hired one group of men to dig the ditch.  They hired another group of men to bring the pipe and place it.  And they hired a third group of men to fill in the ditch.  This was a very good effort, the minister said.  The only thing forgotten was to coordinate the work of the three groups, or tell the men how their part of the project fit into the overall project, or direct the timing of the individual projects. 
And so the first group of men went one day and dug their ditch.  Some time later, the third group of men went and filled in the hole.  And some time after that, the second group of men took the pipe to the place, laid it on the ground on top of the freshly filled-in ditch, and considered their work done.  And all three groups had done exactly as they were asked and paid to do, the minister said.  And yet there is still a problem with water in the village.

He didn't say any more; he didn't need to.  We were drinking tea while he told this story (in English - he spoke pretty good English, though the interpreter had to re-tell the story in Dari for his staff to understand, after which they just smiled softly). 

The Occasional Buzzword

Every workplace has its own jargon.  Here there is a lot of empty phraseology and use of the passive voice, much of it imported from the military, that some people have incorporated into their routine style of speaking in an effort to sound informed and keyed in.  And yes, it makes them sound like blustering know-nothings at times.  Luckily, there are some people who have kept their sense of humor and sense of perspective.  So there is a now famous draft cable that has been furtively shared but never sent out, not that it would ever get clearance.  It's too long to re-print here.  But here are excerpts:

"Subject:  A Key Strategic Tipping-Point Game-Changer

In Afghanistan, the next step could be a key strategic tipping-point game-changer.  By leaning forward in the foxhole and checking the headspace and timing of the program, we could grab the low-hanging fruit while staying at the 30,000 foot level...  The remaining challenge is to socialize the stakeholders and operationalize the cultural coordination across the interagency....  Once the concept has been solidified, we will need to nest it...  The primary challenge has become the ability to get fidelity on the problem set.  Secondarily we need to shape the battlefield and dial it in.  After getting smart so that we do not lose the bubble, the long pole in the tent needs to be identified.  Once we have pinned the rose on someone, then we must send them downrange.  Then we must define the delta so that it can be lashed up.... We must also ensure that the time from flash to bang is short.  Fundamental is the requirement that the key strategic tipping-point game-changer be made to pop.  If it does not pop, it should be devolved and then taken offline.  After adjusting, it is important to brief, so that we can tee off and drill down on it.  It is a go if it is calibrated to the topic.  If not, fears about a resurgent corruption capacity nexus could be realized....  Unity of effort is a big problem especially the first and second orders of effect.  If there is a failure to birddog it, more crosstalk and crosspollination will be required.  Situational awareness is key but it is also important to operationalize the laydown.  Once there has been an operationalization of the concept of incentivization, then it can be distilled and put on a map.  That, of course, does not define the end state or address structural laydowns or possible electronic graveyard issues.  Those issues need to be racked and stacked before going in front of what will become the touchstone entity.  Concomitant risks include becoming a traffic accident in search of an intersection and failure to check the azimuth or define the left and right.  Probably nothing in Afghanistan is as important as the deep dive.  Once the deep dive has been scrubbed, a hot wash can be done.  After that, a cold wash can be dialed in.  The delta can be large, making a drill down difficult, if the product is not properly engaged.  We need to stay focused on first downs.  In sum, a FRAGO is needed."

The sad thing is, there are people here who actually talk like this.

Marine Ball

 This was a Marine Ball different from others we've attended.  For starters, it wasn't in any fancy five-star hotel, though it was catered by the Serena, Kabul's leading hotel.  It was on the Embassy lawn, with (Afghan) carpets strewn everywhere and a big tent to accommodate the hundreds of guests.  The tent was fortunate, since there was a thunderstorm with a rain that was reasonably heavy by Kabul standards.  For another thing, while there are always military personnel present at a Marine Ball, there was a much higher percentage this time.  And finally, the ceremony tends to be the same: video showing significant historical moments of the Marines, message from the Commandant, Ambassador gives a speech, cake cut, oldest Marine and youngest Marine present get the first slices of the cake - but as the last two photos show, there was something else - an empty table setting in honor of and to remember the Marines who cannot attend.  The salt represents the tears shed for their loss; the lemon, the bitterness of their passing; the table setting upside down to signify that he cannot partake of the feast.